WASHINGTON: When they ask Pakistan to sever its alleged ties with the
Taliban, US officials focus on three militant leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
Commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and Commander Nazir.
Diplomatic observers in Washington, however, acknowledge that while urging
Pakistan to end its links to the militants, the Americans do not address the
concerns and fears that force Pakistan to keep an option other than the one
offered by the United States.
The observers point out that the Pakistanis feel the need to cultivate militant
leaders because they fear India’s overwhelming presence in Afghanistan.
Not addressing these concerns ‘leaves Pakistan exposed to Indian encirclement,’
says Aqil Shah, a US expert of Pakistani origin associated with the Columbia
University.
Pakistan sees the evidence of this encirclement ‘in New Delhi’s alleged support
for the insurgency in Pakistan’s resource-rich Balochistan province and in the
Indian funding for a 135-mile road connecting Afghanistan’s Nimroz province with
the Iranian port of Chabahar,’ Mr Shah adds.
According to other experts, the Pakistanis have almost no influence over the
current Afghan government. The traditional Taliban leadership, including Mullah
Omar, too does not trust Pakistan because of its alliance with the United
States.
This forces them to cultivate militant leaders like Mr Hekmatyar and Commander
Haqqani, two key militant leaders fighting the American and allied forces in
Afghanistan.
Commander Nazir, a Pakistani tribal militant, is useful for Islamabad because of
his differences with Baitullah Mehsud who is a greater threat to Pakistan than
any other militant leader.
But in Washington, Commander Nazir is seen as a greater threat to US interests
than Mr Mehsud because he sits right on the Afghan border and is believed to
have links with the Afghan Taliban.
For Pakistan, however, Commander Nazir is a proven asset. They have already used
him once to beat Mr Mehsud’s Uzbek supporters.
Recently, US experts have also begun to acknowledge that the Indian presence in
Afghanistan forces Pakistan to maintain the ties it developed with the militants
during the Afghan war.
‘I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan’s apprehensions about
Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India,’ says
Christine Fair, a leading US expert on South Asia.
'Anyone seeking to wean support for extremists and terrorists in the country has
to address Pakistan’s legitimate security needs,’ says Shaun Gregory, a British
expert and director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of
Bradford.
Mr Shah says that ‘it should not be surprising that the Pakistani military
continues to patronise groups it sees as useful in the regional race for
influence’ because of what the Indians have been doing in Afghanistan.
'They seem to be saying: the Pakistanis did it to us in Kashmir, so we will pay
them back in Balochistan and elsewhere.’
During a recent visit to the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, Ms Fair found that
‘issuing visas was not the main activity’. India, she says, has also ‘run
operations from its mission in Mazar Sharif and is likely doing so from the
other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the
(Pak-Afghan) border’.
While Washington tries to persuade Pakistan to end its links to Mr Hekmatyar, it
has not publicly objected to the Afghan government’s efforts to reach a deal
with him.
In Kabul, Mr Hekmatyar is seen as a useful contact. Unlike Commander Haqqani,
who is not willing to join any peace talks as long as US troops are in
Afghanistan, Mr Hekmatyar is not only willing to talk but also has allowed some
of his lieutenants to join the government.
There are at least five governors and seven advisers in the Kabul government who
are from the Hekmatyar group. But for Pakistan, the Americans have a different
strategy: Regard India as a friend, not a competitor in Afghanistan. Islamabad,
they argue, should focus on fighting the militants, who are the real enemy.
However, as an Indian expert of South Asian affairs, Sumit Ganguly, points out,
Indian activities in Afghanistan make it difficult for Pakistan to accept India
as a friend.
Mr Ganguly, a professor of Political Science at Indiana University, acknowledges
that Indian objectives in Afghanistan are ‘not purely humanitarian’.
India, he says, is working on ‘a pincer movement designed to relieve the
pressure in Kashmir’. Mr Ganguly says he also knows that ‘the Indians have
mucked around in Sindh in retaliation for Pakistani involvement in the Punjab
crisis.’ |
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