The Operations Evaluations Department (OED) of the ADB has presented a bleak picture of the NDP which is part of the government’s 25-year drainage investment envisaged in 1993 under the Drainage System Environmental Assessment for which loans were provided by the ADB and World Bank (WB).

The OED’s project completion report states that the NDP had envisaged 28 outputs under the institutional reforms and drainage investment components, of which only three were completed and seven partly completed.

‘The remaining 18 activities were not initiated,states he report.

In NWFP and Sindh, some of the maintenance and rehabilitation works implemented had not been sustainable- with drains already reverting to their pre-works conditions by project completion. The reluctance of the project implementing agencies (IAs) to comply with land acquisition and resettlement framework agreed to as part of the project designs was one of the reasons.

The report has also termed the ADB’s own performance as ‘unsatisfactory’ besides observing that the national and provincial governments lacked commitment to the sector reforms and were unable to deliver on institutional reforms in a timely manner.

While, criticising the ADB, which has also contributed loans to the project, the evaluation department of the bank has observed that despite the sending of the 12 special loan administration missions, six loan review missions and a midterm review mission by the ADB, the implementation of the project ‘failed to improve’.

In Balochistan, the project’s component included (a) rehabilitation of about 20 km of sub-drains and construction of new on-farm drainage facilities for about 2,000 hectares, (b) modernisation of the management of the Pat Feeder canal system, and (c) rehabilitation of selected distribution canals (d); and performance contracts for about 300 km of drains. Pilot initiatives for decentralisation of system management were also included.

In NWFP, the subcomponent comprised (a) the transfer of about 220 shallow tube wells (STWs) in fresh ground water areas, rehabilitation of about 300 km of subdrains, and construction of new on-farm drainage facilities for about 2,500 hectares; (b) modernisation of the management of NWFP’s major canal systems and rehabilitation of selected distribution canals; and (c) performance contracts for about 1,700 km of drains and about 60 STWs, as well as pilot initiatives for decentralization of system management.

In Sindh, the only component involved was rehabilitation and improvement of about 400 km of sub-drains, transfer of about 1,300 STWs in fresh ground water areas, replacement of STWs in saline ground water areas, and construction of new on-farm drainage facilities for about 2,500 hectares.

The work on the project was started in 1998 which remained till the end of 2007. It was expected to lead to physical improvements in drainage and better drainage operation and maintenance (O&M), with direct impacts for an improved environment and increased agricultural production. Increases in farmer incomes were expected to be up to 30 per cent, depending on local conditions.

The report says that objectives of the project were clear and relevant to the sector, the project design was, however, overly complex and ambitious. The provision of adequate drainage was itself a daunting task, without including institutional reforms that diverted attention from the objective of improving drainage infrastructure and performance.

In effect, the project design set too many objectives to be achieved in order to reach its intended goal. The design identified the risk that if institutional reforms did not proceed as envisaged, progress on infrastructure would be inhibited and the intended benefits of the project jeopardised.

The report cites the failure to implement key policy reforms and insufficient commitment from the Water and Power Development Authority (Wapda) and the provincial irrigation and drainage authorities (PIDAs) to implement institutional reforms for their own organisations as the reasons behind the inability of the project to achieve its goals.

The actual project cost was far lower than the appraisal estimate. This was mainly because the project could not be implemented as envisaged and most of the planned activities were not undertaken. At appraisal, the project was estimated at $185 million, funded by a loan of $140 million from ADB, $40 million from the government (22 per cent of the total), and $5 million from beneficiaries.

The actual project cost was $31.14 million, of which $5.87 million was financed by the government (19 per cent) and the remainder from the loan by the ADB and World Bank (WB).

An amount of $92.9 million was reallocated to other projects. In addition, there was a partial cancellation of surplus funds of $11.3 million in May 2007.